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Axiomatizing hybrid logic using modal logic

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ABSTRACT

We study hybrid logics with nominals and ‘actuality’ operators $@_i$.

We recall the method of ten Cate, Marx, and Viana to simulate hybrid logic using modalities and ‘nice’ frames, and we show that the hybrid logic of a class of frames is the modal logic of the class of its corresponding nice frames. We also extend this definition to ‘fairly nice frames’, to capture their closure under disjoint union.

Using these results, we show how to axiomatize the hybrid logic of any elementary class of frames.

Then we study *quasimodal logics*, which are hybrid logics axiomatized by modal axioms together with basic hybrid axioms common to any hybrid logic, using only orthodox inference rules. We show that the hybrid logic of any elementary modally definable class of frames, or of any elementary class of frames closed under disjoint unions, bounded morphic images, ultraproducts and generated subframes, is quasimodal. We also show that the hybrid analogues of modal logics studied by McKinsey–Lemmon and Hughes are quasimodal.

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1. Introduction

The broad aim of this paper is to study the process of axiomatizing hybrid logics, using modal methods. There are two main strands. First, we generalize to hybrid logic the method of [6] for axiomatizing the modal logic of any elementary class of Kripke frames. Second, we begin a study of how we can axiomatize the hybrid logic of a class K of frames *if we are given the modal logic of K as ‘free’ axioms*.

Different approaches have been taken in the literature to try to axiomatize the hybrid logic of a class of frames. For example, we can find in [2] axiomatizations for the hybrid logic with operator $@$ alone, $@$ and \downarrow , $@$ and \forall , etc. The axiomatizations for $@$ use ‘non-orthodox’ Burgess–Gabbay-style inference rules, such as NAME and BG, and cover only classes of frames definable by pure formulas (i.e., hybrid formulas containing no propositional variables, but only nominals). Further classes of frames can be covered by adding more non-orthodox rules.

In [3], the authors give a slightly different way to axiomatize the hybrid logic of a class of frames characterized by a set of pure formulas. However, the axiomatization is done from scratch: even though hybrid logic is based on modal logic, this axiomatization does not directly take advantage of modal completeness theorems. Moreover, if pure axioms are present, extra ‘non-orthodox’ inference rules are still needed to make the axiomatization complete.

An interesting result can be found in [10]. In this article, a theorem states that any class of frames defined by Sahlqvist formulas can be axiomatized in a way that uses modal completeness theorems, and reflects the fact that hybrid logic is based on modal logic. Indeed, the axioms of the hybrid logics studied in this article are clearly divided into modal axioms

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in one hand, and definition of hybrid logic (hybrid axioms) on the other hand. No non-orthodox rules are needed in this case. [10] also shows that pure and Sahlqvist axioms cannot be readily combined. So there are limits to the classes of frames that are covered.

As we can see, there are two gaps in these results. First, we know that we can axiomatize the class of all frames, any class of frames axiomatized by modal Sahlqvist formulas, and any class of frames defined by pure sentences (if we add extra rules). We would like to be able to axiomatize more classes of frames, preferably using only orthodox inference rules. To this end, we use *nice frames*, which have been proposed by ten Cate et al. (in [10]) as a way to simulate hybrid operators using modal logic. Using classes of nice frames, we show how to axiomatize, with orthodox rules, the hybrid logic of any elementary class of frames.

Second, we would like to separate, in an axiomatization, the hybrid part from the modal part. We would like to know when it is possible to make the axiomatization reflect the fact that hybrid logic is based on modal logic, and when we cannot. So we study the following question: given a class of frames, and its modal axiomatization, what further axioms do we need to axiomatize the hybrid logic of this class? A first step towards an answer will be presented as *quasimodal classes*, in Section 5. These are classes of frames whose hybrid logic is axiomatized by their modal logic together with only basic hybrid axioms, expressing the meaning of the hybrid operators and valid in all frames. We give some criteria for a class to be quasimodal, and consider some examples, including interesting classes of frames whose modal logics were introduced and studied by McKinsey–Lemmon and Hughes.

1.1. Scope of this paper

In this paper, the modal signature is a single box with accessibility relation noted R . The hybrid logic we deal with is $\mathcal{H}(@)$, i.e., the hybrid logic with nominals and ‘actuality’ operators $@_i$. We do not study operators such as \downarrow , \exists , etc.

1.2. Layout of paper

For convenience, and to fix notation, in Section 2 we recall some standard definitions. In Section 3, we present and extend *nice frames*, which have been proposed by ten Cate et al. (in [10]) as a way to simulate hybrid operators using modal logic. We also extend this notion to study the closure of nice frames under disjoint union, in what we call *fairly nice frames* (Section 3.4). These results will be used first in Section 4, to axiomatize the hybrid logic of any elementary class of frames, and then extended in Section 5, to study the hybrid axiomatization of classes of frames when a known modal axiomatization is given. Finally, in Section 6, we apply results of this latter section to modal logics studied by McKinsey–Lemmon and Hughes.

Sections 5 and 6 do not rely on Section 4.

2. Basic definitions

We assume familiarity with modal logic ([3] has ample information). Here, we recall the basics of hybrid logic, and set up some notation. (For readers seeking more recent information on hybrid proof theory, we suggest [2].) Throughout, we fix a countable infinite set \mathcal{P} of propositional letters, and a countable non-empty set \mathcal{N} of nominals. Any element of $\mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{N}$ is a hybrid $\mathcal{H}(@)$ -formula, as is \top ; if ϕ, ψ are $\mathcal{H}(@)$ -formulas, so are $\neg\phi$, $\phi \wedge \psi$, and $\Box\phi$; and if $i \in \mathcal{N}$ then $@_i\phi$ is also an $\mathcal{H}(@)$ -formula. No other things are hybrid $\mathcal{H}(@)$ -formulas.

Semantics of $\mathcal{H}(@)$ -formulas is given by models of the form $\mathcal{M} = \langle W, R, V \rangle$, where $\langle W, R \rangle$ is a Kripke frame and $V : \mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{N} \rightarrow \wp(W)$ (here, \wp denotes power set) is a valuation such that $|V(i)| = 1$ for each $i \in \mathcal{N}$. We write the hybrid satisfaction relation as \models_h in order to distinguish it from ordinary modal evaluation which we write as \models_m . For $w \in W$ and an $\mathcal{H}(@)$ -formula ϕ , we define $\mathcal{M}, w \models_h \phi$ by induction on ϕ : for $x \in \mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{N}$, we let $\mathcal{M}, w \models_h x$ iff $w \in V(x)$; the boolean connectives are handled as usual; $\mathcal{M}, w \models_h \Box\phi$ iff $\mathcal{M}, v \models_h \phi$ for every v with $(w, v) \in R$; and $\mathcal{M}, w \models_h @_i\phi$ iff $\mathcal{M}, v \models_h \phi$, where $V(i) = \{v\}$. An $\mathcal{H}(@)$ -formula ϕ is valid in \mathcal{M} if $\mathcal{M}, w \models_h \phi$ for all worlds w of \mathcal{M} , valid in a frame \mathfrak{F} if it is valid in all models with frame \mathfrak{F} , and valid in a class K of frames if it is valid in all frames in K . We use the notations $\mathcal{M} \models_h \phi$, $\mathfrak{F} \models_h \phi$, $K \models_h \phi$, respectively, for these notions.

Notation. For a set S of modal formulas and a modal formula ϕ , we write $S \vdash_m \phi$ if ϕ is provable using as axioms all propositional tautologies, normality of \Box (i.e., $\Box(p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (\Box p \rightarrow \Box q)$), and formulas in S , and using the standard inference rules of modus ponens, substitution, and box-generalization (from ϕ , derive $\Box\phi$). Formally, S being a set of modal formulas, and ϕ a modal formula, if $S \vdash_m \phi$, then any set of modal formulas containing the axioms and closed under the rules contains ϕ .¹ We will define a hybrid variant \vdash_h later (Definition 3.8).

¹ Warning: this notation is not standard. We are *not* using it to mean that $\vdash_m \sigma_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \sigma_n \rightarrow \phi$ for some $\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_n \in S$. For example, for distinct $p, q \in \mathcal{P}$, we have $\{p\} \vdash_m q$ in our notation but not in this one.

3. Hybrid extension of modal classes

As hybrid logic is close to modal logic, it would be interesting if one could apply modal theorems to hybrid logic. Ten Cate et al. have, in [10], defined nice frames, which give a way to simulate hybrid operators using modal logic, and so to apply results from modal logic to hybrid logic. In this section, we extend this method.

3.1. Nice frames

We recall here how [10] proposed to treat hybrid operators as modalities.

Definition 3.1. (From [10, §3].) A *non-standard frame* is a frame of the form $\mathfrak{F} = \langle W, R, (R_i)_{i \in \mathcal{N}}, (S_i)_{i \in \mathcal{N}} \rangle$, where R and the R_i are binary relations on W , and S_i are unary relations on W .

This is in contrast with what we will call *standard frames*, which are ordinary Kripke frames of the form $\langle W, R \rangle$. The idea behind non-standard frames is that for any nominal i , $@_i$ is treated as a unary modality with accessibility relation R_i , and i is treated as a nullary modality with accessibility relation S_i . Thus, the semantics associated to non-standard frames is:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{M}, w \models_m i & \quad \text{iff} \quad w \in S_i, \\ \mathcal{M}, w \models_m @_i \phi & \quad \text{iff} \quad \forall w' (R_i(w, w') \implies \mathcal{M}, w' \models_m \phi), \end{aligned}$$

where w is a world of a model \mathcal{M} based on a non-standard frame.

A non-standard frame is said to be *nice* if for each $i \in \mathcal{N}$, S_i is a singleton and $\forall xy (R_i(x, y) \leftrightarrow S_i(y))$ is true. A model is said to be *non-standard* (respectively *nice*) if its frame is non-standard (resp. nice).

The following lemma shows that evaluating a formula in a nice frame is, in a certain sense, equivalent to evaluating it in the hybrid valuation.

Lemma 3.2. (From [10, Lemma 3.2].) Let $\mathcal{M}_m = \langle W, R, (R_i)_{i \in \mathcal{N}}, (S_i)_{i \in \mathcal{N}}, V_m \rangle$ be a nice model, where $V_m : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \wp(W)$, and let $\mathcal{M}_h = \langle W, R, V_h \rangle$ (where $V_h = V_m \cup \{(i, S_i) \mid i \in \mathcal{N}\}$) be its corresponding hybrid model. Then, for any world $w \in W$ and hybrid formula ϕ , we have:

$$\mathcal{M}_h, w \models_h \phi \quad \text{iff} \quad \mathcal{M}_m, w \models_m \phi.$$

Definition 3.3. (From [10, §2].) We call Δ the following set of axioms, for all $i, j \in \mathcal{N}$ and $p \in \mathcal{P}$ (we also give their first-order correspondent):

$$\begin{aligned} (\text{agree}) \quad & @_i p \rightarrow @_j @_i p \quad \forall xyz (R_j(x, y) \wedge R_i(y, z) \rightarrow R_i(x, z)), \\ (\text{propagation}) \quad & @_i p \rightarrow \Box @_i p \quad \forall xyz (R(x, y) \wedge R_i(y, z) \rightarrow R_i(x, z)), \\ (\text{elimination}) \quad & (@_i p \wedge i) \rightarrow p \quad \forall x (S_i(x) \rightarrow R_i(x, x)), \\ (\text{ref}) \quad & @_i i \quad \forall xy (R_i(x, y) \rightarrow S_i(y)), \\ (\text{self-dual}) \quad & @_i p \leftrightarrow \neg @_i \neg p \quad \forall x \exists! y (R_i(x, y)). \end{aligned}$$

We now extend [10, Lemma 3.3].

Lemma 3.4. For any non-standard frame \mathfrak{F} , \mathfrak{F} is nice iff \mathfrak{F} is weakly connected (i.e., there exists a path between any two worlds using any relation or reverse relation of \mathfrak{F}) and \mathfrak{F} validates Δ .

Proof. The left-to-right direction is obvious: once we noticed that a nice frame is weakly connected (any two worlds x and y are connected by relations $R_i(x, i)$ and $R_i^{-1}(i, y)$, where i is an arbitrary nominal), it is easy to prove the first-order correspondents of Δ (which are given in the previous definition) from the definition of niceness.

For the right-to-left direction, consider $\mathfrak{F} = \langle W, R, (R_i), (S_i) \rangle$, a weakly connected frame validating Δ . Let us show that it is nice. We use here the first-order correspondents of the axioms Δ .

First, we want to show that for all x, y , we have $R_i(x, y)$ iff $S_i(y)$. The left-to-right direction is the axiom ‘ref’. The right-to-left direction is less obvious.

Let x and y be two worlds such that $S_i(y)$. As x and y are weakly connected, there exists a sequence $(t_m)_{m \leq n}$, for a finite n , where $x = t_0$, $y = t_n$ and $\mathcal{R}_m(t_{m-1}, t_m)$ where $1 \leq m \leq n$ and \mathcal{R}_m is one of the relations R, R^{-1}, R_j, R_j^{-1} for any nominal j .

We show by induction that for all m , we have $R_i(t_m, y)$. The base case is given by the ‘elimination’ axiom: $R_i(t_n, y)$. Then, suppose we have $R_i(t_m, y)$. The previous element t_{m-1} in the sequence can be related to t_m in four different ways.

- $R(t_{m-1}, t_m)$ By the axiom ‘propagation’, we get $R_i(t_{m-1}, y)$.

- $R(t_m, t_{m-1})$ By the axiom ‘self-dual’, there exists y' such that $R_i(t_{m-1}, y')$. With ‘propagation’, we get $R_i(t_m, y')$. But by ‘self-dual’ again, $y = y'$, and so, we have $R_i(t_{m-1}, y)$.
- $R_j(t_{m-1}, t_m)$ By the axiom ‘agree’, we get $R_i(t_{m-1}, y)$.
- $R_j(t_m, t_{m-1})$ By the axiom ‘self-dual’, there exists y' such that $R_i(t_{m-1}, y')$. With ‘agree’, we get $R_i(t_m, y')$. But by ‘self-dual’ again, $y = y'$, and so, we have $R_i(t_{m-1}, y)$.

At last, by induction, we get $R_i(x, y)$.

Now we have to show that S_i is a singleton. By ‘self-dual’, S_i is not empty. Suppose now that there exist y and z such that $S_i(y)$ and $S_i(z)$. Let x be any world. We just proved that we have $R_i(x, y)$ and $R_i(x, z)$. Therefore, by ‘self-dual’, y and z are the same world. S_i is a singleton. \square

3.2. Hybrid extension

An important limitation of nice frames is that evaluation of nominals is bound to the frame, whereas in hybrid logic, it is bound to the model. So, a hybrid formula valid, in the non-standard semantics, in a frame, is only valid, in the hybrid semantics, in some of the models that can be built over this frame: those that agree on the valuation of the nominals. The idea we develop here to solve this problem is to consider, in the same class of nice frames, all the possible evaluations of nominals of a given modal frame. This will be done in *hybrid extensions*.

Before defining this extension, we give the following notations. Given a class K of standard frames, we call $ML(K)$ the modal logic of K : that is, the set of all modal formulas valid in K . The logic $HL(K)$ is the hybrid logic of K . At last, L being a class of non-standard frames, $NS(L)$ (for Non-Standard) is the hybrid logic that is valid in L in the non-standard semantics, i.e., $NS(L)$ is the set of hybrid formulas valid in L when $@_i$ and i (for all $i \in \mathcal{N}$) are interpreted as modalities.

In other words:

$$\begin{aligned} ML(K) &= \{\text{modal formulas } \phi : K \models_m \phi\}, \\ HL(K) &= \{\text{hybrid } \mathcal{H}(@)\text{-formulas } \phi : K \models_h \phi\}, \\ NS(L) &= \{\text{hybrid } \mathcal{H}(@)\text{-formulas } \phi : L \models_m \phi\}. \end{aligned}$$

Definition 3.5. Let K be a class of standard frames. The *hybrid extension* of K is the class $\mathcal{H}(K)$ of nice frames that can be built over K :

$$\mathcal{H}(K) = \{\text{nice frames } \langle W, R, (R_i)_{i \in \mathcal{N}}, (S_i)_{i \in \mathcal{N}} \rangle \text{ such that } \langle W, R \rangle \in K\}.$$

Let $\mathfrak{F} = \langle W, R, (R_i)_{i \in \mathcal{N}}, (S_i)_{i \in \mathcal{N}} \rangle$ be a non-standard frame. The *modal reduct* of \mathfrak{F} is the standard frame $\mathfrak{F}^M = \langle W, R \rangle$.

Given this definition, [Lemma 3.2](#), which described in which sense we can consider that non-standard and modal semantics are equivalent, can be extended to classes.

Theorem 3.6. For all classes K of standard frames, the hybrid logic of K is the modal logic of $\mathcal{H}(K)$:

$$NS(\mathcal{H}(K)) = HL(K).$$

Proof (Sketch).² We know by [Lemma 3.2](#) that evaluating a formula in a non-standard model or in the corresponding hybrid model are equivalent. From this, we can show a similar result with class of frames, that is: K being a class of standard frames, and ϕ a hybrid formula, $K \models_h \phi$ iff $\mathcal{H}(K) \models_m \phi$. Then, it is straightforward to extend this result to a whole logic instead of a single formula, and we get $NS(\mathcal{H}(K)) = HL(K)$. \square

We show in the next theorem that hybrid extensions also preserve the fact that a class is elementary. We introduce notation \models_f which describes first-order evaluation.

Theorem 3.7. K being an elementary class of standard frames, its hybrid extension $\mathcal{H}(K)$ is elementary.

Proof. Suppose $K = \{\mathfrak{F} : \mathfrak{F} \models_f T\}$, where T is a first-order theory in the signature $\{R\}$, and let K' be the class of non-standard models of $T' = T \cup H$, where:

$$H = \bigcup_{i \in \mathcal{N}} \{\forall xy (R_i(x, y) \leftrightarrow S_i(y)), \forall xy ((S_i(x) \wedge S_i(y)) \rightarrow x = y), \exists x S_i(x)\}.$$

² You can find in [\[9\]](#) the full proofs of some propositions and theorems for which we only give sketches or omit proofs in this paper.

Let us show that $K' = \mathcal{H}(K)$.

(\supseteq) By definition, frames of $\mathcal{H}(K)$ are nice, so they validate H . By definition, K validates T , so, $\mathcal{H}(K)$ validates T as well ($\mathcal{H}(K)$ only adds relations to K , that do not occur in T). So $\mathcal{H}(K) \subseteq K'$.

(\subseteq) Frames of K' validate H , so they are nice. They validate T by definition.

Let $\mathfrak{F} = \langle W, R, (R_i), (S_i) \rangle$ be a frame of K' . $K' \models_f T$, so $\mathfrak{F} \models_f T$. But formulas of T are first-order formulas that do not use R_i and S_i , so $\mathfrak{F}^M \models_f T$ as well. Thus, $\mathfrak{F}^M \in K$, by definition, and, as \mathfrak{F} is nice, $\mathfrak{F} \in \mathcal{H}(K)$. \square

The converse theorem is also true, but we will not use it in this article, and the proof is longer. It can be found in [9].

3.3. Hybrid and non-standard modal provability

These notions will be needed in the following sections.

Definition 3.8. For a set S of $\mathcal{H}(@)$ -formulas and an $\mathcal{H}(@)$ -formula ϕ , we write $S \vdash_h \phi$ if ϕ is provable using as axioms all propositional tautologies, normality of \Box and $@_i$ ($i \in \mathcal{N}$), and formulas in $S \cup \Delta$, using the rules modus ponens, sorted substitution (if ϕ is derivable then so is any formula built from ϕ by uniformly replacing proposition letters by arbitrary formulas and nominals by nominals), box-generalization, and $@$ -generalization (from ϕ , derive $@_i \phi$ for any $i \in \mathcal{N}$). This system is as in [10]. (See footnote 1.)

We write $S \vdash_m^{ns} \phi$ if $S \vdash_m \phi$ when nominals and $@_i$ s are regarded as nullary (respectively, unary) modalities. (So the axioms and rules of \vdash_m of Section 2 are augmented by normality and generalization for each $@_i$.)

To remind ourselves that Δ is included as basic axioms of \vdash_h , we will often say that a hybrid logic of the form $\{\phi \in \mathcal{H}(@): \Delta \vdash_h \phi\}$ is *axiomatized by* $\Delta \cup \Delta$.

Lemma 3.9. Let S be a set of $\mathcal{H}(@)$ -formulas that is closed under substitution of nominals in its formulas (that is, if $\phi \in S$ then $\phi' \in S$ for any ϕ' obtained from ϕ by substitution of nominals for nominals). Let ϕ an $\mathcal{H}(@)$ -formula. The following are equivalent:

- (i) $S \vdash_h \phi$,
- (ii) $S \cup \Delta \vdash_m^{ns} \phi$.

Proof. The only difference between $S \cup \Delta \vdash_m^{ns}$ and $S \vdash_h$ is that substitution of nominals for nominals is an inference rule of only the latter. Still, an easy induction on length of a formal proof will show that if $S \cup \Delta \vdash_m^{ns} \phi$ then $S \vdash_h \phi$, and if $S \vdash_h \phi$ then $S \cup \Delta \vdash_m^{ns} \phi'$ for any ϕ' obtained from ϕ by substitution of nominals for nominals. This is enough to prove the lemma. \square

3.4. Fairly nice frames

Nice frames have a big limitation. Although, as we will prove in this part, niceness is preserved under bounded morphic image, generated subframe and ultraroot, it is not preserved under disjoint union.

In this part, we define *fairly nice frames*, which seem interesting for several reasons. First, the image of a fairly nice frame by disjoint union remains fairly nice. Then validity of Δ characterizes these frames.

Let us study preservation of niceness under some classical frame constructions.

Lemma 3.10. Niceness is preserved under bounded morphic image, generated subframe, ultraroot and ultraproduct, but is not, in general, preserved under disjoint union.

Sketch of proof. Bounded morphic image and generated subframe: The proof is a simple application of the definition of these operations.

Ultraroot and ultraproduct: Niceness can be defined by first-order sentences, so by Łoś's theorem, it is preserved by these operations.

Disjoint union: by definition, a nice frame is weakly connected. So the disjoint union of at least two frames is not nice. \square

Since disjoint union does not preserve niceness, we introduce the following definition to deal with it.

Definition 3.11. A non-standard frame is said to be *fairly nice* if it is the disjoint union of nice frames.

It is easily seen that fairly niceness is preserved by the frame constructions we use in the previous lemma, including disjoint union.

We now give a non-standard characterization of fairly niceness.

Lemma 3.12. *A non-standard frame \mathfrak{F} is fairly nice iff $\mathfrak{F} \models_m \Delta$.*

Proof. (\Rightarrow) By definition, a fairly nice frame \mathfrak{F} is the union of nice frames, which validate Δ (by Lemma 3.4). As non-standard validity is preserved by disjoint union, \mathfrak{F} validates Δ as well.

(\Leftarrow) Let \mathfrak{F} be a non-standard frame validating Δ . We consider it as the union of some weakly connected frames (possibly a single frame if \mathfrak{F} itself is weakly connected). Each of these weakly connected frames validates Δ , since each of these frames can be seen as a generated subframe of \mathfrak{F} . By Lemma 3.4, each of these frames is nice, so \mathfrak{F} is fairly nice. \square

Since niceness is not preserved by disjoint union, but this operation preserves modal validity, it is not possible to modally define niceness. Fairly niceness is a notion that is both close to niceness, and modally definable.

4. Elementarily generated hybrid logics

Hodkinson [6] gave a method of constructing an axiomatization of the modal logic of any elementary class of frames. We will use this result, together with the hybrid extension we just defined, to axiomatize the hybrid logic of any elementary class of frames.

Theorem 4.1. *For any elementary class of frames K , one can construct a set Λ of axioms for $\text{HL}(K)$ from first-order sentences defining K .*

Proof. Let K be an elementary class of frames. By Theorem 3.7, we know that $\mathcal{H}(K)$ is elementary. Thus, [6, Theorem 5.16] says that there exists a modal axiomatization Λ of $\text{NS}(\mathcal{H}(K))$, constructed from first-order sentences defining $\mathcal{H}(K)$, which can themselves be constructed from first-order sentences defining K (see proof of Theorem 3.7). Formally, $\text{NS}(\mathcal{H}(K)) = \{\phi \in \mathcal{H}(@): \Lambda \vdash_m^{ns} \phi\}$. This remains true if we close Λ under substitution of nominals for nominals, since by definition of $\mathcal{H}(K)$, such substitutions do not affect validity in $\mathcal{H}(K)$.

By Theorem 3.6, $\text{NS}(\mathcal{H}(K))$ is the hybrid logic of K . Moreover, $\text{NS}(\mathcal{H}(K))$ is an *hybrid logic*, in the sense that it contains the axioms Δ (for frames of $\mathcal{H}(K)$ are nice, so they validate Δ). So $\Lambda \vdash_m^{ns} \delta$ for every $\delta \in \Delta$, which means that ' $\Lambda \vdash_m^{ns}$ ' is the same as ' $\Lambda \cup \Delta \vdash_m^{ns}$ '. Therefore, $\text{HL}(K) = \text{NS}(\mathcal{H}(K)) = \{\phi \in \mathcal{H}(@): \Lambda \vdash_m^{ns} \phi\} = \{\phi \in \mathcal{H}(@): \Lambda \cup \Delta \vdash_m^{ns} \phi\}$. By Lemma 3.9, this is $\{\phi \in \mathcal{H}(@): \Lambda \vdash_h \phi\}$, as required. \square

Of course, the axiomatization we obtain is always infinite, and not always transparent. See [6] for further discussion.

A remark about the result of [6] we use here is necessary. In that paper, the case of nullary modalities is unfortunately not explicitly considered. We conjecture that the result of [6] can be extended to this case, but formally the existing result cannot be applied in our situation, as the i are modalities of arity 0. So we simulate i in a different way: we define the unary modality i with the following semantics:

$$\mathfrak{F}, V, x \models_m i(\phi) \quad \text{iff} \quad \forall y \text{ if } S'_i(x, y) \text{ then } \mathfrak{F}, V, y \models_m \phi$$

where S'_i is defined by: $S'_i(x, y)$ iff $x = y$ and $S_i(x)$.

Then, the nominal i would be written $i(\top)$, and we would eventually get: $\mathfrak{F}, V, x \models_m i(\top)$ iff $S_i(x)$.

5. Quasimodal classes

In the previous section, we used hybrid extensions and nice classes to axiomatize any elementary class of frames. In this section, we use the same tools with a different approach to axiomatize some specific classes of frames, that we will call *quasimodal classes*.

Hybrid logic is defined as a layer over modal logic. However, axiomatization of the hybrid logic of classes of frames is often done from scratch, without separating modal axioms from hybrid ones.

In this section, we study the hybrid logic of classes of frames whose modal logic is already known. That is, given a class of frames and its modal axiomatization, which hybrid axioms do we need to add to get the hybrid logic of the same class of frames? Some classes will only need Δ , which describes the hybrid operators, but some others may need more axioms, which means that some properties of the frames could not be expressed using modal logic only. So, we obtain a measure of how much more information than the modal logic is carried by the hybrid logic of the class.

As a first attempt, we propose here to study cases where no hybrid axioms are needed, except Δ , which defines hybrid logic. In such logics, which will be called *quasimodal logics*, hybrid semantics does not bring anything more, concerning axiomatization, than its own definition.

Definition 5.1.

- (i) An hybrid logic Λ is *quasimodal*³ if it is axiomatized by $\Theta \cup \Delta$, where Θ is a set of modal axioms (that is, without nominals or @-operators), and Δ is the set of hybrid axioms defined in Definition 3.3. Formally, Λ is quasimodal if there exists a set Θ of modal formulas such that $\Lambda = \{\phi \in \mathcal{H}(@): \Theta \vdash_h \phi\}$.
- (ii) We say that a class of standard frames is *quasimodal* if its hybrid logic is quasimodal.

As an attempt to characterize quasimodal classes of frames, we will show in Theorem 5.4 that a class of frames closed under disjoint union, bounded morphic image, generated subframe and ultraproduct is quasimodal. First we prove a useful lemma.

Lemma 5.2. *Let K be a class of standard frames that contains the canonical frame of $\text{ML}(K)$. Then $\text{HL}(K)$ is quasimodal.*

Proof. Let $\Lambda = \{\phi \in \mathcal{H}(@): \text{ML}(K) \vdash_h \phi\}$ be the hybrid logic axiomatized by $\text{ML}(K) \cup \Delta$. We show that $\Lambda = \text{HL}(K)$.

First, as $\text{ML}(K) \subseteq \text{HL}(K)$, by soundness of \vdash_h we get: $\Lambda \subseteq \text{HL}(K)$.

For the converse inclusion, consider a hybrid formula ϕ not in Λ . Since $\text{ML}(K) \cup \Delta$ is closed under nominal substitutions, Lemma 3.9 yields

$$\Lambda = \{\psi \in \mathcal{H}(@): \text{ML}(K) \cup \Delta \vdash_m^{ns} \psi\}, \quad (1)$$

so $\Lambda \cup \{\neg\phi\}$ is modally consistent in the non-standard sense. Let \mathcal{C} be the canonical model of Λ in the language $\mathcal{H}(@)$, in the non-standard sense. Let \mathcal{M} be a submodel of \mathcal{C} , generated by a world in which $\neg\phi$ is true. Let \mathfrak{F} be the (non-standard) frame of \mathcal{M} . Since Δ is Sahlqvist and valid in \mathcal{M} , it is valid in \mathfrak{F} . As \mathfrak{F} is weakly connected, by Lemma 3.4 we see that \mathfrak{F} is nice. We know that \mathcal{M} does not validate ϕ in the non-standard modal sense. So by Lemma 3.2, ϕ is not valid in the modal reduct \mathfrak{F}^M of \mathfrak{F} in the hybrid sense (i.e., $\mathfrak{F}^M \not\models_h \phi$).

Let $\mathcal{Q} = \mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{N} \cup \{\@_i\psi: \@_i\psi \in \mathcal{H}(@)\}$ (we suppose that these three sets are pairwise disjoint). Then \mathcal{Q} is countably infinite, so we may choose a bijection $\pi: \mathcal{Q} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}$. Now define, for each $\psi \in \mathcal{H}(@)$, a modal formula $\psi\downarrow$, by induction: $\psi\downarrow = \pi(\psi)$ for $\psi \in \mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{N}$, $\top\downarrow = \top$, \downarrow commutes with the boolean operators and \Box , and $(\@_i\psi)\downarrow = \pi(\@_i\psi)$. Also define, for each modal formula α , an $\mathcal{H}(@)$ -formula $\alpha\uparrow$, by induction: $p\uparrow = \pi^{-1}(p)$ for $p \in \mathcal{P}$, $\top\uparrow = \top$, and \uparrow commutes with the boolean operators and \Box . So $\alpha\uparrow$ is a substitution instance of α . These maps extend to sets of formulas in the obvious way, by $w\downarrow = \{\psi\downarrow: \psi \in w\}$ and $s\uparrow = \{\alpha\uparrow: \alpha \in s\}$. Easy inductions show that $\psi\downarrow\uparrow = \psi$ and $\alpha\uparrow\downarrow = \alpha$ for any ψ, α .

Now if α is any modal formula and $\text{ML}(K) \vdash_m \alpha$, then $\alpha \in \text{ML}(K)$. Therefore, $\text{ML}(K) \cup \Delta \vdash_m^{ns} \alpha\uparrow$: indeed, $(\alpha, \alpha\uparrow)$ is a formal proof of $\alpha\uparrow$ in this system, since $\alpha \in \text{ML}(K) \cup \Delta$, $\alpha\uparrow$ is a substitution instance of α , and substitution is a rule of \vdash_m^{ns} . By (1), $\alpha\uparrow \in \Lambda$.

It follows that if w is a world of \mathcal{M} then $w\downarrow$ is consistent in the modal logic $\text{ML}(K)$. For otherwise, there are $\psi_1, \dots, \psi_n \in w$ such that $\text{ML}(K) \vdash_m \neg(\psi_1\downarrow \wedge \dots \wedge \psi_n\downarrow)$. By the above, $(\neg(\psi_1\downarrow \wedge \dots \wedge \psi_n\downarrow))\uparrow = \neg(\psi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \psi_n) \in \Lambda$, contradicting the Λ -consistency of w . Clearly, if α is any modal formula then $\alpha\uparrow \in w$ or $\neg(\alpha\uparrow) \in w$, and so $\alpha\uparrow\downarrow = \alpha \in w\downarrow$ or $(\neg(\alpha\uparrow))\downarrow = \neg\alpha \in w\downarrow$. Hence, $w\downarrow$ is maximal consistent in the modal logic $\text{ML}(K)$.

This means that $\downarrow: w \mapsto w\downarrow$ is a well defined map from \mathfrak{F}^M into the canonical frame \mathfrak{G} (say) of $\text{ML}(K)$. The map is certainly injective, since $w\downarrow\uparrow = w$. We claim that it is a bounded morphism. We write R_\Box for the canonical accessibility relation in both \mathfrak{F}^M and \mathfrak{G} . The ‘forth’ property is clear: if $wR_\Box u$ in \mathfrak{F}^M and $\Box\alpha \in w\downarrow$, then $(\Box\alpha)\uparrow = \Box(\alpha\uparrow) \in w\downarrow\uparrow = w$, so $\alpha\uparrow \in u$ and $\alpha\uparrow\downarrow = \alpha \in u\downarrow$, proving that $w\downarrow R_\Box u\downarrow$. For the ‘back’ property, suppose that $w\downarrow R_\Box s$ for some w in \mathfrak{F}^M and s in \mathfrak{G} . Since $s\uparrow\downarrow = s$, it suffices to show that $s\uparrow$ is in \mathfrak{F}^M and $wR_\Box s\uparrow$. Suppose for contradiction that $s\uparrow$ is inconsistent with respect to Λ in the non-standard sense. Since s is closed under \wedge and \uparrow commutes with \wedge , there is $\alpha \in s$ such that $\neg(\alpha\uparrow) \in \Lambda$. By generalization, $\Box\neg(\alpha\uparrow) \in \Lambda \subseteq w$, and so $(\Box\neg(\alpha\uparrow))\downarrow = \Box\neg\alpha \in w\downarrow$. Since $w\downarrow R_\Box s$, we obtain $\neg\alpha \in s$, and since $\alpha \in s$ this contradicts the consistency of s . So $s\uparrow$ is Λ -consistent. Clearly, it is *maximal* consistent, and so in \mathfrak{F}^M . We have $wR_\Box s\uparrow$ because if $\Box\psi \in w$ then $(\Box\psi)\downarrow = \Box(\psi\downarrow) \in w\downarrow$, so $\psi\downarrow \in s$ and $\psi\downarrow\uparrow = \psi \in s\uparrow$. This proves the claim.

So \mathfrak{F}^M is isomorphic to a generated subframe of \mathfrak{G} . As hybrid $\mathcal{H}(@)$ -validity is preserved under generated subframes, $\mathfrak{G} \models_h \phi$. But we are given that $\mathfrak{G} \in K$. Hence, $\phi \in \text{HL}(K)$. \square

Remark 5.3. Ten Cate et al. proved the following statement in [10, Theorem 3.4]. *Let Σ be a set of modal Sahlqvist formulas not containing nominals or satisfaction operators. Then, the hybrid logic axiomatized by $\Sigma \cup \Delta$ is sound and strongly complete for the class of frames defined by Σ . We show that this theorem is a particular case of the previous lemma.*

Let K be the class of frames defined by Σ . We show that we can apply Lemma 5.2 on K . By Sahlqvist’s completeness theorem, the canonical frame for $\text{ML}(K)$ validates Σ , thus this canonical frame is in K . Therefore, by Lemma 5.2, the hybrid logic of K is axiomatized by $\Delta \cup \Sigma$. Inspecting the proof of Lemma 5.2 shows that strong completeness can also be proven. We will not go into the details here.

³ “Quasimodal” logic (and classes) were called “stable” in [9].

From now on, *nearly all frames mentioned are standard modal frames*, so we drop the adjective ‘standard’. We can now give some properties that make a class of frames quasimodal. They show that quasimodal frame classes and hybrid logics are rather common. We call *the three fundamental frame constructions* the following operations: generated subframes, bounded morphic images, and disjoint unions (these operations are known to preserve modal validity).

Theorem 5.4.

- (i) If Λ is a canonical modal logic, then the class of all frames that validate Λ is quasimodal.
- (ii) A class of frames closed under the three fundamental frame constructions and ultraproducts is quasimodal.
- (iii) A modally definable elementary class of frames is quasimodal.

Proof. Part (i) is immediate from Lemma 5.2.

Let K be a frame matching conditions of (ii). By a result of Goldblatt [4, (4.9), p. 580], the canonical frame of $ML(K)$ is in $SHUdPuK = K$ (for a class L of frames, SL , HL , UdL and PuL represent, respectively, the class of generated subframes, bounded morphic images, disjoint unions, and ultraproducts of frames of L). By Lemma 5.2, K is quasimodal.

Part (iii) follows, since any class of frames satisfying the hypotheses of (iii) also satisfies the hypotheses of (ii). \square

Remark 5.5. The theorem is not a characterization, as one can easily find a quasimodal class that is not modally definable, and a quasimodal class that is not closed under the three fundamental operations.

Example 5.6. This theorem can be applied to prove that the following classes of frames are quasimodal: reflexive frames, Euclidean frames, transitive frames, dense frames, symmetric frames, frames validating K4.1, the class of all frames, and the empty class.

The previous theorem can be used to show the quasimodality of some classes, as we did in the previous example. Here is a theorem that will be used to prove that some classes are not quasimodal.

Theorem 5.7. Let Λ be the modal logic of the quasimodal class K of frames, and let L be a class of frames containing K and having the same modal logic Λ .

- (i) K and L have the same hybrid logic.
- (ii) L is quasimodal.

Proof. (i) (\supseteq) $K \subseteq L$, so $HL(K) \supseteq HL(L)$.

(\subseteq) As K is quasimodal, its hybrid logic is axiomatized by $\Lambda \cup \Delta$: that is, $\Lambda \vdash_h HL(K)$. But L , by hypothesis, validates Λ . And by definition of the hybrid semantics, it validates Δ as well. Thus, L validates $\Lambda \cup \Delta$, which entails $HL(K)$. So $HL(K) \subseteq HL(L)$.

(ii) We just proved that K and L have the same hybrid logic. As K is quasimodal, L is quasimodal as well. \square

Two straightforward applications of this theorem will be used to give some examples of non-quasimodal classes.

Corollary 5.8.

- (i) K being a class of frames, if there exists a frame that validates $ML(K)$ and invalidates $HL(K)$, then K is not quasimodal.
- (ii) Let K be a class of frames, and ϕ a hybrid formula valid in K . If ϕ is not valid in the closure of K under the three fundamental operations and ultraroots, then K is not quasimodal.

Proof. (i) Suppose that there exists a frame \mathfrak{F} that validates $ML(K)$ but not $HL(K)$. Then $K \cup \{\mathfrak{F}\}$ has the same modal logic as K , but not the same hybrid logic. So by Theorem 5.7, K cannot be quasimodal.

(ii) The closure of K under the operations contains K , and these classes have the same modal logic $ML(K)$, since these operations preserve modal validity. If K were quasimodal, Theorem 5.7 would be applicable, and K and its closure would have the same hybrid logic, which is false because of ϕ . \square

We show an application of this corollary in the following example, in which we can use either part (i) or (ii) of the corollary.

Example 5.9. As $i \rightarrow \Box \neg i$ characterizes irreflexivity and is not preserved by bounded morphic images, the class of irreflexive frames is not quasimodal.

By a *tree*, we mean an acyclic frame that contains a unique root from which each world is accessible, and in which every world which is not the root has a unique predecessor. The class of all trees is not quasimodal. The formula $(@_i \Diamond k \wedge$

$@_j \diamond k \rightarrow @_i j$ (which states that a world cannot have two ancestors) is valid in every tree. However, using the three fundamental frame constructions applied to trees, one can build a frame in which the ‘unique root’ property fails or this formula can be falsified.

The class of frames having at most n worlds (for each $n \geq 1$) is characterized by $\bigvee_{0 \leq x < y \leq n} @_{i_x} i_{y_x}$, which is not preserved by disjoint union. Thus, this class is not quasimodal.

Theorem 5.7 shows that among the frame classes that validate a given modal logic, any quasimodal classes remain quasimodal when we add new frames to them. This is supported by an interesting behavior that can be observed with the two latter classes of frames in the example just given. Indeed, any non-empty class of frames included in one of them is not quasimodal (even if its modal logic is larger).

Let us prove this result for the class of trees. The proof is very similar for the class of frames of at most n worlds. Let K be a non-empty class of frames included in the class of all trees. Thus, this class contains only trees, and formula $(@_i \diamond k \wedge @_j \diamond k) \rightarrow @_i j$ is valid in it. However, one can, out of K , and with the three fundamental frame constructions, build a frame that is not a tree. Thus, K is not quasimodal.

We might therefore conjecture that *a class included in a non-quasimodal class of frames is not quasimodal*. But this is wrong: for instance, the class of frames with an empty relation is quasimodal (it is elementary and modally definable) and included in the class of irreflexive frames, which is not quasimodal. A question that arises is: which conditions on a non-quasimodal class are needed to make every (non-empty) subclass of it non-quasimodal? By **Theorem 5.7**, ‘any subclass of it has the same modal logic’ is a sufficient condition, but are there more enlightening ones?

6. McKinsey–Lemmon and Hughes’s logics

The McKinsey–Lemmon and Hughes logics are remarkable modal logics that have been studied for a long time. They are not finitely axiomatizable, each one is the logic of an elementary class of frames, and for each of these logics, the class of frames validating it is not elementary.

We first detail a little more of what is known about these logics, and then we give a few new results about their hybrid extensions.

6.1. Background

6.1.1. Hughes’s logic

KMT , or *Hughes’s logic*, introduced in [7], is the logic axiomatized by the following axioms:

$$\diamond((\Box p_1 \rightarrow p_1) \wedge \cdots \wedge (\Box p_n \rightarrow p_n)) \quad (\text{for each } n \geq 1).$$

It is the logic of both \mathcal{C}_T , the class of frames in which each world has a reflexive successor, and \mathcal{C}_T^* , the class of frames validating KMT . \mathcal{C}_T is elementary and defined by the first-order sentence $\forall x \exists y (R(x, y) \wedge R(y, y))$. Hughes proved that KMT is not finitely axiomatizable [7, Theorem 10] and that \mathcal{C}_T^* is not elementary [7, Theorem 11].

6.1.2. McKinsey–Lemmon logic

KM^∞ , or the *McKinsey–Lemmon logic*, is axiomatized by the following axioms:

$$\diamond((\Diamond p_1 \rightarrow \Box p_1) \wedge \cdots \wedge (\Diamond p_n \rightarrow \Box p_n)) \quad (\text{for each } n \geq 1).$$

An early study of this logic is in [8, p. 74]. It is the logic of \mathcal{C}_∞ , the class of frames in which each world has a successor with at most one successor, and \mathcal{C}_∞^* , the class of frames validating KM^∞ .

\mathcal{C}_∞ is defined by the first-order sentence $\forall x \exists y (R(x, y) \wedge \forall z t (R(y, z) \wedge R(y, t) \rightarrow z = t))$. On the other hand, \mathcal{C}_∞^* is not elementary. This has been proved independently, in [1, Theorem 21] and [5, Theorem 2.2], by the same argument, based on one of van Benthem [11] for McKinsey’s formula $\Box \Diamond p \rightarrow \Diamond \Box p$ (which is equivalent to the instance for $n = 1$ of the above axiom schema).

Goldblatt and Hodkinson [5, Corollary 4.5] show that KM^∞ is not finitely axiomatizable.

6.2. Hybrid extensions of the McKinsey–Lemmon and Hughes logics

In this section, we shall prove that \mathcal{C}_T and \mathcal{C}_T^* on one hand, and \mathcal{C}_∞ and \mathcal{C}_∞^* on the other hand, have the same hybrid logic, and that these hybrid logics are quasimodal. We also prove that the hybrid logics of these classes are not finitely axiomatizable.

Proposition 6.1.

- (i) \mathcal{C}_T and \mathcal{C}_T^* have the same hybrid logic, and are quasimodal.
- (ii) \mathcal{C}_∞ and \mathcal{C}_∞^* have the same hybrid logic, and are quasimodal.

Sketch of proof. (i) As \mathcal{C}_T is defined as the class of frames in which each world has a reflexive successor, it is elementary, and one can easily check that it is closed under bounded morphic images, disjoint unions and generated subframes. So we can apply [Theorem 5.4](#): \mathcal{C}_T is quasimodal. By definition, \mathcal{C}_T is included in \mathcal{C}_T^* , and they have the same modal logic, so we can apply [Theorem 5.7](#) to prove the first part of this proposition.

(ii) The same proof applies for \mathcal{C}_∞ , as it is defined as the class of frames in which each world has a successor with at most one successor. \square

We know that KMT and KM^∞ are not finitely axiomatizable. We can wonder whether the hybrid operators we introduce are sufficient to build a finite set of axioms that entails KMT and KM^∞ . We show in [Corollary 6.3](#) that this is not the case: the hybrid logic of \mathcal{C}_T and \mathcal{C}_T^* (resp. \mathcal{C}_∞ and \mathcal{C}_∞^*), which is axiomatized by $KMT \cup \Delta$ (resp. $KM^\infty \cup \Delta$), is not finitely axiomatizable.

Lemma 6.2. Let $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots$ be modal formulas and suppose that for each $n \geq 1$,

- (i) $\alpha_{n+1} \vdash_m \alpha_n$,
- (ii) there exists a frame \mathfrak{F}_n validating α_n but not α_{n+1} .

Then the hybrid logic Θ axiomatized by $\{\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots\} \cup \Delta$ is not finitely axiomatizable.

Proof. Assume for contradiction that θ is an $\mathcal{H}(@)$ -formula that axiomatizes Θ . As θ is a theorem of Θ , there is n such that $\{\alpha_n\} \vdash_h \theta$. As $\mathfrak{F}_n \models_h \alpha_n$, we have $\mathfrak{F}_n \models_h \theta$. But $\{\theta\} \vdash_h \alpha_{n+1}$, so $\mathfrak{F}_n \models_h \alpha_{n+1}$, which is a contradiction. \square

Corollary 6.3. $HL(\mathcal{C}_\infty)$ and $HL(\mathcal{C}_T)$ are not finitely axiomatizable.

Proof. Since both these logics are quasimodal, by [\[5, Lemmas 3.7–3.8\]](#) and [\[7, Theorem 7\]](#), $HL(\mathcal{C}_\infty)$ and $HL(\mathcal{C}_T)$ are axiomatized by Δ together with formulas α_n with the above properties. So we can apply [Lemma 6.2](#). \square

7. Conclusion

In this paper, we axiomatized the hybrid logic of two kind of frames: elementary classes of frames, and quasimodal classes of frames. Both these results used hybrid extensions, which we defined and studied, building on the nice frames of [\[10\]](#).

We axiomatized hybrid logics of elementary classes of frames, by applying [\[6\]](#) to the hybrid extension; this shows the usefulness of these nice frames and of the hybrid extensions.

Quasimodal logics have then been studied for the purpose of separating the hybrid and modal parts of hybrid axiomatization. The general question we would like to answer is: given a hybrid logic, which is the modal part of this logic, and which is the hybrid part? Quasimodal logics (and quasimodal classes) are the elements of the answer to this question in the simplest case, where the hybrid component is reduced to the five axiom schemas defining hybrid logic. However, it would be interesting to continue this work (see further work below).

Finally, we studied the Hughes and McKinsey–Lemmon logics. Each of these modal logics is the logic of (at least) two classes of frames, one elementary, and one non-elementary. We showed that the hybrid logics of these two classes are the same: this means that hybrid logic does not seem to be powerful enough to differentiate these two classes of frames. We also proved that these hybrid logics are not finitely axiomatizable. These two results, analogous to known modal results, show that these logics might be as interesting in the hybrid case as they were in the modal case.

7.1. Further work

We give here some directions that we think may be interesting to investigate.

Can the hybrid operator \downarrow be simulated by modalities, in a similar way to the modal simulation of $@$ in [\[10\]](#) and in [Section 3](#)?

An idea is to consider, for a standard frame \mathfrak{F} , the disjoint union of the frames of the hybrid extension of $\{\mathfrak{F}\}$ (the class having only one frame \mathfrak{F}). We get a frame containing the disjoint union of all the possible valuations of \mathfrak{F} . Then, the operator \downarrow is simply a move from one subframe to another one having a different valuation.

We only dealt with frames having one unary modality \square . It may be of interest to extend the results of this paper to arbitrary frames with many polyadic modalities.

We began to work on characterizing quasimodal classes in Section 5. Although we gave some properties about quasimodal classes, we could not solve this problem.

We showed that one might have expected the statement “A class included in a class that is not quasimodal is not quasimodal either” to be true. However, we showed that it is false. Can we find a weaker, and true, version of this statement, such as “A class included in a non-quasimodal class matching [some conditions] is not quasimodal”?

This is a problem totally different from the previous one we stated, but, given a finite set Γ of hybrid axioms, is the problem “Is the hybrid logic axiomatized by Γ quasimodal?” decidable? If it is so, what is its complexity?

Quasimodal logics were what seemed the easiest way to separate hybrid axioms from modal axioms. Indeed, in quasimodal logics, we surely cannot remove the hybrid axioms, since they are the very definition of nominals and hybrid operators.

It is possible to have a similar separation for a wider range of logics? Blackburn et al., in [3], studied the hybrid logic of frames axiomatized by pure formulas (formulas not containing propositional variables, but only nominals). Although they give an interesting result (the class of frames validating a set Π of pure formulas is axiomatized by the hybrid logic $\Delta \cup \Pi$), first, they need to add extra rules to the logic, and second, we do not know if fewer hybrid axioms would be needed if we added the entire modal logic as axioms. Can we find a theorem without these extra rules? Can we prove something like: *The hybrid logic of a class of frames defined by a set Π of pure formulas is axiomatized by its modal logic together with $\Delta \cup \Pi$?*

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